The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump's announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF's internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF's ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times.
Introduction
The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010, represents a new kind of funding institution in the emerging field of climate finance governance. This is due to its direct creation by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the equal representation of developed and developing countries on its Board, its pursuit of equal mitigation and adaptation financing, and its mandate to engage directly with the private sector.
However, the GCF could face challenges of operationalization not only due to its relatively new status as an international fund but also as a result of US President Trump's announcement that the United States (US) would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The This article analyzes these challenges in the next section. In sections 3 and 4, it explores how certain design features of the GCF could be utilized to strengthen its resilience or capacity to sustain its operations, and fulfil its mandates in the face of financial or policy shocks, such as the withdrawal of pledged US funding. Specifically, we focus on two emerging areas that could prove crucial in enabling the GCF's role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement: first, interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and second, engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially cities and the private sector. The article concludes in Part 5 that a key challenge and opportunity for the GCF in both of these areas will be to help improve communication between public institutions, the private sector, and local actors in order to build trust, know-how and a project pipeline that can sustain the transition to a low carbon and climate-resilient world.
The Trump Administration and GCF Governance Challenges
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US would 'withdraw' from the Paris Agreement. Specifically, he announced that the US 'will cease all implementation of the nonbinding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country', including ending implementation of the US Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (The White House, 2017) . Importantly, the US President's statement included a broad condemnation of the GCF, which he described as, among other things, "costing the United States a vast fortune", signalling a dramatic US policy and attitudinal change toward it.
This presents at least three challenges for the GCF: first, sufficient capitalization of the Fund; second, workable governance of the Fund at Board level; and third, oversight and guidance of the Fund by the UNFCCC COP. Each challenge is discussed in turn below.
Capitalization of the Fund
Under its 2016 Contribution Arrangement and 2017 addendum with the GCF, the US agreed to pay US$3 billion into the GCF's Trust Fund 'subject to the availability of funds' (GCF 2016, par.1) of which $1 billion was paid by the US under the Obama Administration.
Therefore, the US repudiation of its prior commitment has created a US$2 billion gap in the GCF's finances. To put this in context, this US$2 billion is deducted from just over US$10 billion in signed pledges to the GCF (GCF 2018). The change of US policy may be particularly disruptive to the Private Sector Facility, given that the Contribution Arrangement included the US expectation that at least half of its contributions would support private sector activity . Alongside the US, the other major GCF contributors are the European Union and Japan. No party has announced that it will cover the shortfall resulting from the US reneging on its funding pledge.
What recourse, if any, does the GCF have against the US for this apparent breach of agreement? A 'Contribution Arrangement' exists between the GCF and the US; however the vast majority of contributing countries to the GCF have signed a 'Contribution Agreement'.
Agreements tend to be governed by the GCF Trust Fund Agreement (GCF 2016, par. 2), annexed to which are the Standard Provisions Applicable to the Contributions to the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund (Standard Provisions) . The Standard Provisions provide that '[t] he Fund, the Trustee and the Contributors shall, to the extent possible, strive to resolve and settle promptly and amicably questions of interpretation and application of a Contribution Agreement and any disputes, controversy or claims arising out of or relating to any Contribution Agreement' (ibid, par 9.1). Where a 'dispute, controversy or claim' has not been settled in this manner, it 'shall be settled in accordance with the dispute resolution mechanism set out in the applicable Contribution Agreement, if any such mechanism is so specified in that Contribution Agreement' (ibid, par. 9.2). The apparent purpose of utilizing a 'Contribution Arrangement' designation in the case of the US is to reduce the legally binding effect of that document. For example, whilst the US Contribution Arrangement is governed by the Standard Provisions mentioned above, the US Contribution Arrangement specifies that all instances of the word 'shall' in the Standard Provisions are deemed to be 'will' for the purposes of the US Contribution Arrangement (GCF 2016, par. 9.1), which implies a lower standard of obligation for the US. Importantly, unlike most Contribution Agreements, the GCF-US Contribution Arrangement sets out no dispute resolution mechanism (in contrast, 20
Contribution Agreements provide for final and binding arbitration). 2 It therefore leaves the GCF without any specified recourse to adjudicatory proceedings to recover the missing US$2 billion.
The GCF was established by the COP as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC; its role in serving the Paris Agreement (as mandated by the COP in 2015) is additional and independent. Thus, it would be legally possible for a future US administration to resume GCF contributions as a party to the UNFCCC, even if it remained outside the Paris Agreement. Indeed, as discussed further below, three Belgian regional governments, none of which are parties to either the UNFCCC or Paris Agreement, have pledged contributions to the GCF. However, there is currently no indication that this would be the preferred policy of a future US administration.
Board-level Governance of the Fund
The GCF's Governing Instrument provides that the Fund 'will be governed and supervised by a Board that will have full responsibility for funding decisions' (UNFCCC 2011, par 5). In the context of UNFCCC finance, the 'unusually powerful' (Thompson, 2016, p.146) and autonomous nature of the GCF Board may be contrasted with the Adaptation Fund Board and the Global Environment Facility Council (GEF) (Kulovesi 2012) . Whereas the GEF Council 'shall act in conformity with' the COP (GEF 2011, par. 15 ) and the AF Board is 'under the authority and guidance' of the COP (UNFCCC 2008, par. 4) , the GCF Board receives only 'guidance' from the COP and has 'full responsibility for funding decisions' (GCF Governing Instrument, articles 5-6). The GCF Board has 24 members, equally composed of developing and developed countries, and decisions, including investment decisions, must be taken by consensus (UNFCCC 2011, paragraph 14) . The Rules of Procedure of the Board, which supplement the Governing Instrument, provide that the Co-Chairs are responsible for all procedural matters, including 'putting questions to a vote if consensus is not reached' (GCF Board 2013a, paragraph 12). The GCF Secretariat has done some work on options for a Board voting system (GCF Board 2015a), but the Board is yet to adopt any such system. In practice, the absence of consensus has at times prevented the adoption of decisions, even in circumstances where there has been only one holdout. For example, in 2016 India blocked approval of a Pakistan-based project until new conditions were added (Sethi 2016) .
Currently, the Board includes a US delegate, nominated as one of the representatives of developed countries, whose appointment runs until December 2018. Given the current US administration's stated hostility to the GCF, including the claim that the US contribution of $1 billion included 'funds raided out of America's budget for the war against terrorism' (White House 2017), it is possible that a current or future US Board member will be instructed by the administration to frustrate the conduct of the Board's business, including by blocking funding decisions. At the contentious July 2018 Board meeting, during which the Board was unable to find consensus to approve any new projects, the US representative called for a 'donor-driven' replenishment process (Darby 2018) . This approach proved divisive given the institutional design of the GCF to achieve balance between donors and recipients and due to the US having reneged on the majority of its financial commitments to the GCF.
Could a US Board member acting in a disruptive manner be removed from the Board prior to the conclusion of the applicable term? The Governing Instrument provides only that '[t]he members of the Board and their alternates will be selected by their respective constituency or regional group within a constituency' (UNFCCC 2011, paragraph 11). The Rules of Procedure add that '[a]ny replacement of the Board member or alternate member within a term shall be made and notified to the Secretariat by the developed or developing country Party or group of these that selected the Board member or alternate member' (GCF Board 2013a, par 5). Therefore, the decision to replace an obstructive US Board member would rest with the developed country Parties to the UNFCCC as a group.
Oversight and guidance by the UNFCCC COP
Third, there is the potential challenge to the guidance provided to the GCF by the COP, which created the GCF and holds ultimate authority over it. US President Trump has stated that even while withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, the US would 'begin negotiations to reenter either the Paris Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that are fair to the United States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its taxpayers' (The White House 2017). The Governing Instrument provides that the GCF 'will be accountable to and function under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties' (UNFCCC 2011, par 4). Since the GCF's establishment, the COP has regularly provided guidance on a broad range of matters (e.g. the Fund's linkages to the Technology Mechanism, as discussed below), with the GCF Board taking up COP guidance in its decisions. Although the COP has occasionally adopted decisions over the clear objection of one or more Parties, this has been intensely controversial amongst Parties and is not a regular practice (Vogel 2014) . In addition to the potential problem at GCF Board level, the US could also use its ability to block COP (and now the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement or CMA) consensus decisions to thwart the provision of guidance to the GCF. A US 'veto' over GCF-related COP decisions can therefore be considered a realistic threat, which would last until a change of American policy, or in the case of the CMA, until US withdrawal becomes effective in 2020 .
Building Linkages Between the Financial Mechanism and the Technology Mechanism
The GCF faces these challenges in the context of an evolving governance structure that makes it tightly interwoven into the broader UNFCCC architecture. These interlinkages, 
Non-Party Stakeholder Engagement with the GCF
In addition to deepening interlinkages between the GCF and other UNFCCC mechanisms, GCF resilience and impact can be strengthened by enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, including cities and the private sector. Indeed, in the context of the US reneging on its pledge to the GCF and creating higher burdens for remaining countries, direct engagement with a wider array of actors is required to ensure greater impact from pledged government funds.
UNFCCC Context and GCF Set-up
Following its adoption, the GCF's Governing Instrument was hailed as a 'progressive, forward-looking document', and the Fund itself a potential exemplar of an increasingly decentralised and responsive climate governance (Carlarne 2012 at 20-21) . For the GCF to fulfil this potential, however, deep and ongoing engagement with the non-Party stakeholders that command both knowledge and finance will be necessary. Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement exemplifies a traditional model of multilateral climate finance as being provided by developed country governments to developing country governments. 3 While faithful to this model, the GCF is also mandated to develop other modalities and funding relationships, including engagement with governments at all levels and also with the private sector, including finance actors (GCF Board 2015b). This mandate is particularly important given the imprecision of Party obligations to capitalize the GCF (Fridahl et al 2014) .
This enhanced engagement by and with non-Party actors is not specific to the GCF but is rather a defining characteristic of the broader Paris Agreement process and outcomes. It is In short, the objective of the PSF is to 'fund and mobilize institutional investors and leverage GCF's funds to encourage corporates to co-invest' (GCF undated(e)). The PSF can be seen as the GCF's major point of difference with preexisting climate finance institutions, and has been identified as probably the 'highest added-value' of the GCF in the perception of donors (De Sepibus 2015) . Some developing country parties have also encouraged the GCF to develop private sector modalities (see, e.g, AOSIS 2017). To this end, the GCF seeks heightened engagement with pension funds, insurance companies, corporations, local and regional financial intermediaries, and the capital markets in its activities.
Specific Points of Interaction by Non-Party Actors with the GCF
There are three main ways in which non-Party actors can engage directly with GCF funding processes: philanthropically as donors to the GCF; structurally as Direct Accredited Entities; and strategically as co-financiers. Each is discussed in turn below. Prior to its operationalization, the GCF was identified as an instance of 'private finance … being increasingly integrated in the core activities of public multilateral funds' (Vinuales 2014) .
While this potential is arguably as yet unrealized, the developments discussed below indicate that the GCF is moving in this direction.
Philanthropically as Donors
The GCF Governing Instrument provides that '[t] (Mathiesen 2017 ). In addition, the GCF is encouraging private sector actors to donate to the Fund.
However, none have done so to date. 4 If philanthropy were to become a significant funding source for the GCF, it would raise questions of legitimacy and accountability that multilateral climate financing instruments have not had to address to date. There is broad agreement that the pool of Accredited Entities needs to be diversified. Some commentators have highlighted the need to include more national development banks and local government ministries to augment country ownership (Steele 2016) . Others have suggested accreditation of more transnational commercial banks, impact investors, and private equity funds, using the logic that such actors can best mainstream green investments in the real economies of developing countries (Smith and Rai 2015) . However, prioritising the accreditation of more private sector banks is not without criticism. Transnational commercial and investment banks tend to prefer large-scale investments due to lower transaction costs, but these may not succeed in small island developing states and least developed countries where smaller-scale and local projects are more appropriate. In other words, such banks tend to prefer types of projects with which they are familiar but which are unlikely to be transformational (Rai 2016) . This is further confirmed by research which suggests a significant 'implementation gap' for non-state actor initiatives in developing countries (Chan et al. 2018) . Critics also highlight that many big banks have conflictual internal policies, such as continuing to finance fossil fuels, which run counter to GCF and Paris Agreement imperatives (e.g. Kumar 2015; Robinson-Tillett 2015) .
Structurally as Direct Accredited Entities
Thus, diversification beyond big banks would be a positive step. Indeed, diversification ought to embrace entirely new categories of actor within the private sector. However, doing so may depend on resolving the current uncertainty over what kinds of entity are eligible for accreditation. In response to a request from the GCF Board, the GCF's Accreditation Committee proposed the option of a 'principles-based approach to accreditation', with applicants to be assessed on the basis of (inter alia) '[a] record of deploying finance through open untied procurement' and '[a] proven capacity to implement projects effectively' (GCF Board 2017a, par 8). The Accreditation Committee also reported that some of its members recommended deeming some entities to be 'ineligible' for accreditation, including consultancies which are 'unlikely to have a track record or capacity as implementing agencies' and may be 'better suited to partner as service providers or advisors to GCF-funded activities' (GCF Board 2017a, par 9). In October 2017, the GCF Board decided to commence a review of the accreditation framework and tasked the GCF Secretariat to develop a framework revision proposal that 'includes other modalities for institutions to work with the GCF' (GCF Board 2017b). This review was ongoing at the time of writing. In our view, the most sensible approach will be for the GCF Board to consider which additional actors might best help the Fund to fulfill its mandate to 'promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways' (UNFCCC 2011, Art 2).
On this point, a little-remarked fact about the current list of Accredited Entities is its complete lack of private sector legal and regulatory specialists. Yet this omission is striking, given that a critical challenge for developing countries in accessing finance is to create an enabling legal and policy environment that can attract investment (see e.g. Gramkow and Anger-Kraavi 2018). As mentioned above, the GCF is mandated to help countries not just through increased financial flows for projects but also through financial support for building endogenous capacity. Thus, developing robust national legal and regulatory frameworks for the receipt of public climate finance (through, for example, a national climate fund), as well as proactively incentivising private investments from local and transnational actors (through, for example, domestic financial regulation and corporate and taxation legislation) will be critical. Indeed, some multilateral development banks are already moving on this issue. For example, under its Law and Policy Reform Program, the Asian Development Bank provides technical assistance to developing countries to support legal and institutional development and capacity strengthening for climate investments (Morita and Pak, 2018) . Importantly, having legal and regulatory frameworks in place not only increases the economic and financial attractiveness of climate-related investments (eg tariff controls or tax credits) but also encourages investor confidence by reducing perceived regulatory and sovereign risks. Clearly, building that kind of capacity requires development of legal and regulatory expertise in-country. An important corollary of building legal capacity for regulatory frameworks is that this strengthens country ownership in financial processes, helping to address the concern that over-involvement by the private sector and/or financial institutions would devolve or contract out government engagement and thus undermine a country-driven approach.
In short, in order to facilitate legal and regulatory (capacity building) proposals for GCF funding, there is an argument for law firms and other regulatory and governance experts to become Accredited Entities, alongside financial institutions and actors.
Strategically as Co-financiers
A third entry point for non-Party engagement with the GCF is by the private sector providing co-finance for projects and programmes as mobilized and leveraged by the PSF.
By June 2018 the GCF had committed of US$3.7 billion in total financing and 76 projects had been approved for funding, with public sector funding slightly greater than private sector funding (60% vs 40%) (GCF, undated(g) ). Yet, although nearly half of GCF funding to date has come from the private sector, it has been either for mitigation-only or cross-cutting projects. As at March 2018 only one adaptation-only project had been privately funded. This is particularly important for the objectives of the Fund and interlinkage. There is no doubt that public funding is crucial for adaptation projects given that their returns tend to be social and not financial. Community benefits -known as 'social returns' -of investments in areas such as airports, utilities, or seawalls, are typically outside the scope of private sector investment decision-making, and the long planning timeframes for major infrastructureoften amounting to several decades -present challenges for business case evaluations (Bowman 2015) . Yet the statistics above raise the question of whether public money could be better leveraged by the GCF to incentivise private investment for adaptation through innovative approaches. This could provide new business opportunities and also highlight climate-related risks that exist for the private sector (Pauw 2015) . Some have argued that such innovation is imperative, not just for adaptation, but for projects across the board if the GCF is to reach its $100 billion target (Michaelowa, Allen and Sha 2018) . A potential innovation would be to increase the use of guarantees to de-risk investments. The GCF Portfolio Dashboard shows that grants and loans are the preferred GCF financial instruments with their use at 86% combined. In contrast, equity accounts for only 11%, and guarantees for only 3% of GCF financial instruments (across all projects) (GCF undated(g)). Given the importance of guarantees for de-risking investments, this is surprising. Certainly, a guarantee transfers project risk to government (and ultimately the taxpayer), so public guarantees add risks to government balance sheets which can be a deterrence to using them. However, that risk can be mitigated by conscientious legal design of the guarantee, for which legal and regulatory expertise is required. Arguably, addressing such barriers is part of the GCF's role.
By utilising guarantees and also encouraging more equity, the GCF could mobilise private investment in adaptation through support for research and development, financing technology, and facilitating insurance for climate-resilient infrastructure and agriculture (Steele 2016) . Indeed, these options could create an entry point for engagement by commercial banks and insurance companies that could genuinely add value.
In addition to co-financing, in 2017, the GCF directly invited private sector applications for funding by launching a US$500 million request for proposals (RFP). The RFP invited entities to 'propose projects and programmes that deploy private sector investment in support of mitigation and adaptation activity in developing countries' and which are 'designed to crowd in private sector investment that fits within national climate priorities' and 'at scale' (Cooper 2017 The reason is to attract more and different private sector GCF partners such as corporates and institutional investors. This is a step in the right direction for enhancing diversification of Accredited Entities. Second, proposals may incorporate requests for grants to support capacity building such as technical support, training, and regulatory framework development.
Indeed, proposals will be evaluated on their proposed level of impact, which includes 'regulatory reform or development' to 'prompt a positive change in the market or regulatory environment that will enable future investment into climate activity' and also 'institutional capacity building' in 'local markets for further investments in climate activity' (GCF Board 2017c, par 7). Thus, legal and regulatory capacity building are identified by the GCF as core elements of desirable GCF projects/programmes. In this way, the GCF seeks to attract new high-impact projects/programmes as well as more varied private sector partners.
Conclusion
The planned US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has created several governance challenges for the GCF, namely sufficient capitalization of the Fund, workable Board-level governance of the Fund, and oversight and guidance of the Fund by the UNFCCC COP. The funding challenge is already felt; whether the governance challenges are latent or realized will depend on the instructions by the administration to US representatives in the climate negotiations and on the GCF Board. Yet this article has contended that two emerging innovations could prove crucial in the face of these challenges to enable the GCF to fulfil its role in implementing the Paris Agreement. . First, interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and second, engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially cities and the private sector.
Regarding the latter area of non-Party engagement, the GCF PSF aims to respond to a 'significant market gap and an unmet demand for innovative approaches and financial instruments' concerning the mobilisation of the private sector, especially in developing countries (GCF Board 2017c, par 3). This gap is particularly acute concerning adaptation, with limited public sector investment thus far resulting in 'little to no leverage of private sector finance' (ibid, par 7). In the context of the US reneging on its pledge to the GCF, and broader strain on public sector budgets in many developed countries, the attractions of direct engagement with the private sector are clear. By using GCF resources to leverage private sector investment, the GCF is able to achieve a greater impact from the funds pledged to it by governments. In addition, by reducing barriers to, and building the capacity of, private sector investment in developing countries, the GCF is able to broaden the base of climate finance.
The GCF has been critised for its excessively 'state-centric governance' (in contrast to 'multi-stakeholder governance') (Abbott and Gartner 2012) . Deeper engagement with nonParty stakeholders as Accredited Entities and through the PSF may also serve to address this concern.
These dynamics could strengthen the resilience of the GCF and its project pipeline, in the face of disruptions such as the US renunciation of its funding pledge. In this context, the role of the private sector is both crucial and positive. Most large US investors and financiers, Importantly, our analysis reveals that there is a new and clear role for the GCF through its engagement with non-Party actors, a role that is softer -but no less important -than the three hard intersection points provided in this article. That is, the GCF could be a key interlocutor between law-and policy-makers and private sector financiers. Playing this role could help bridge the divide amongst these key players by providing modalities of communication and know-how to overcome the connection issues that so often plague cross-sectoral interactions, and which some say ought to be the focus of future COPs (e.g. Callaghan and Tennant 2017).
As this article has posited, a good place to start this soft process is through the tripartite interface between the GCF PSF, Direct Accredited Entities and NDAs within the GCF framework, and by continuing to strengthen interlinkages between the Technology and Financial Mechanisms within the broader UNFCCC matrix.
